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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
based on the same transaction with other jury counterclaims, 43 the
court held that both parties, by their conduct in delaying disposition of
the issues through"an over-zealous adherence to procedural, prelimi-
nary detail,"' 44 waived the right to a jury trial.145
The parties amply demonstrated that they were not serious about
their right to a trial by jury. Instead, their general behavior evinced an
intention to waive this right -a waiver according to decisional law.
Ironically, the county court felt compelled to return the case to the city
court to determine whether it could dispose of the case without the use
of a referee. 46
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5222: Liability of the judgment creditor is not absolute.
Under the CPA, money judgments were enforceable by execution
or supplementary proceedings. 47 Consequently there were numerous
inconsistencies within each procedure and many money judgments
remained unsatisfied, or were satisfied only after extensive litigation
involving the expenditure of substantial amounts of time and money. 48
CPLR 5222 was introduced to eliminate these dual procedures and to
create a simple and consistent system for the enforcement of money
judgments. 49 The rule provides in part that
[a] judgment creditor who has specified personal property or debt
in a restraining notice shall be liable to the owner of the property
or the person to whom the debt is owed, if other than the judg-
ment debtor, for any damages sustained by reason of the restraint
. 150
While disposing of one problem, the statute created a new one. Is
the judgment creditor's liability absolute, or subject to a finding of
irresponsibility or bad faith? The civil court, in Stathopoulos v. Sea-
ways Shipping Corp.,'51 chose the latter approach.
143 Academy Street Realty Corp. v. Young, 25 App. Div. 2d 485, 266 N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d
Dep't 1966); Sue v. Homer, 15 App. Div. 2d 729, 223 N.Y.S.2d 231 (4th Dep't 1962); Liberty
Bank of Buffalo v. Lansing, 259 App. Div. 797, 18 N.Y.S.2d 311 (4th Dep't 1940); see also
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 4102, supp. commentary at 41 (1970). Professor Seigal notes that in
such a situation a single fact-finder is required in order to preclude inconsistent determi-
nations.
144 67 Misc. 2d at 476, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
145 See, e.g., Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 11 N.Y.2d 367, 183 N.E.2d 754, 229
N.Y.S.2d 740 (1962).
146 67 Misc. 2d at 477, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
14712 NEW YoRK STANDARD CIVIL PRACTICE SERV. 60 (1963).
148 Id. 59.
149 9 CARMODY-WArr 2d 64:2, at 331 n.7 (1966).
150 CPLR 5222(b).
15166 Misc. 2d 607, 321 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
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The defendant in Stathopoulos was a judgment creditor of George
Stathos, who was then a co-plaintiff in another action. Upon learning of
settlement of that action, and prior to entry of judgment thereon, de-
fendant's attorney, pursuant to CPLR 5222, served a restraining notice
on the attorney in possession of the settlement funds. Unknown to de-
fendant, however, George Stathos had previously assigned his interest
in the cause of action to his mother, the plaintiff in the present action.
The Supreme Court, New York County, found for the defendant, but
the Appellate Division, First Department, modified the judgment to
give priority to plaintiff's assignment.152 The question remained, how-
ever, whether
... a judgment creditor, who serves a restraining notice pursuant to
CPLR 5222 upon a third party, specifying property or debt which
on its face belongs to the judgment debtor, in good faith and with-
out any prior knowledge of an adverse claim to the property
or debt, should be held liable to an adverse claimant for damages,
in the event it is later established that the adverse claimant's in-
terest is superior to that of the judgment creditor.153
Upon consideration of related statutes,'54 the appellate court con-
cluded that there could be no liability if a judgment creditor had pur-
sued his claim in good faith, and could not, "in the normal exercise of
reasonable care, determine [that] the restrained property was in fact the
property of another."'155 The court reasoned that the Legislature did
not intend to require an attorney to risk a damage suit against his client
by executing on property which apparently belonged to the judgment
debtor.'166 In view of the facts in the immediate case-(1) that the
property in question was in the name of the judgment debtor, and
(2) that the property had been privately assigned to his mother-the
court held that defendant could not have known of the assignment and
therefore was not liable for the resulting damage. 57
Undoubtedly the Stathopoulos decision is justified upon the facts
presented. The assignment of property by a judgment debtor to a
relative or close friend is usually undetectable by a judgment creditor.
Then too, an assignment made with knowledge of an outstanding judg-
ment against one's property might well be considered less than honest.
152 Stathos v. Murphy, 26 App. Div. 2d 500, 276 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Ist Dep't 1966), aff'd,
19 N.Y.2d 883, 227 N.E.2d 880, 281 N.YS.2d 81 (1967), overruled, Harold Moorstein & Co.,
Inc. v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 651, 254 N.E.2d 767, 306 N.Y.S2d 466 (1969) (mem).
1.3 66 Misc. 2d at 608, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
154 See 6 WK&-M 5232.12.
'55 66 Misc. 2d at 609, 321 N.YS.2d at 720.
'56 Id. at 610, 321 N.YS.2d at 720.
'57 Id. at 609-10, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
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Clearly, justice would not be served by imposing absolute liability on
the unwary judgment creditor.
CPLR 5240: Court protects "interested" third party from execution
sale.
CPLR 5240 was designed to enable the court, "at any time, on its
own initiation or the motion of any interested'58 person," to "make
an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or
modifying the use of any enforcement procedure." This section em-
powers the court "to prevent unreasonable annoyance and abuse in the
use of the provisions of article 52 of the CPLR in enforcing judg-
ments."'159 But it does not authorize the court to ignore the procedures
of article 52. It only permits "a certain amount of tinkering on the
structure by the judicial handyman .... not.., the construction of an
entirely new wing using jurisprudential architecture."' 60
In a recent case, Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp.,161 petitioner
sought an order, grounded upon CPLR 5240, to prevent the sale of
her estranged husband's interest in a residence owned by them as
tenants by the entirety and presently occupied by petitioner and her
four infant children. The judgment, for $502.74, had been entered
against the husband almost six years ago and the execution, upon which
the proposed sale was predicated, had been obtained in February, 1971.
The court concluded "that to subject petitioner to the consequences
that would flow from the transfer of her husband's interest to a third
party and, perhaps more importantly, to subject her children to the
risk that their home would be lost entirely if their mother did not sur-
vive their father is not warranted."'' 62 It therefore granted the petition.
158" 'Interested' as used in CPLR 5240 would encompass any person, whether or not a
party, who is in danger of suffering pecuniary loss or of being subjected to harassment
through the use of an enforcement procedure." 6 WK&:M 5240.02. Cf. O'Brien v. Fago, 54
Misc. 2d 203, 205, 282 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1967), where Aetna Insurance
Company, as an interested party, brought a proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5240. The court
held "that a surety who has made payments under a labor and material payment bond has
superior rights to those of a judgment creditor to the funds in the hands of an owner
earmarked for payment under a contract for work to be performed ...." (Citations omit-
ted.)
159 Cook v. H.R.H. Constr. Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d 806, 807, 302 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366
(2d Dep't 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 532, 574 (1970).
160 Kaplan v. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co., 46 Misc. 2d 574, 578, 260 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
161 66 Misc. 2d 791, 322 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).
162 Id. at 793, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 202. This is especially true since petitioner has invested
much more in the property than the amount represented by respondent's judgment. The
court's action was predicated on the motion of an interested party. See note 1 supra.
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